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Abstract. Let n be an RSA modulus and let P;Q 2 (Z=nZ)[X]. This
paper explores the following problem: Given polynomials Q and Q(P),
ﬁnd polynomial P. We shed light on the connections between the above
problem and the RSA problem and derive from it new zero-knowledge
protocols suited to smart-card applications.
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1 Introduction
Smart cards play an active role in security systems. Their salient features make
them attractive in numerous applications, including —to name a few— the ar-
easofbanking,telephone,health,payTV,homecomputers,andcommunication
networks.
One of the primary use of smart cards resides in authentication. There exist
basically two families of methods currently used for authenticating purposes.
The ﬁrst family relies on secret-key one-way functions while the second one
makes use of public-key techniques. Both families have their own advantages.
Thispaperfocusesonthesecondfamily.Inparticular,westudyzero-knowledge
techniques. In a typical scenario, the smart card, characterized by a set of cre-
dentials, plays the role of the proving entity.
The ﬁrst practical zero-knowledge protocol is due to Fiat and Shamir [3].
Remarkably, the protocol is rather ecient, computation-wise. It amounts to at
most two modular multiplications per interaction. However, in order to reach
a level of conﬁdence of (1   2 k), the basic protocol has to be repeated k times
—a typical value for k is k = 40. In order to reduce the communication over-
head, there is also a multiple-key protocol, at the expense of more key material.
Another zero-knowledge protocol well suited to smart-card applications is theGuillou-Quisquater protocol [4] (a.k.a. GQ protocol). The GQ protocol features
small storage requirements and needs a single interaction.
In this paper we introduce a new problem, the Polynomial Composition Prob-
lem, which can be stated as follows.
Let P and Q be two polynomials in (Z=nZ)[X] where n is an RSA
modulus. Given polynomials Q and S := Q(P), ﬁnd P.
Most public-key cryptographic schemes base their security on the diculty of
solving a hard mathematical problem. Given that the number of hard problems
harnessable to cryptographic applications is rather limited, the investigation
of new problems is of central importance in cryptography. To understand the
Polynomial Composition Problem and its variants, we explore in the following
sections the way in which the PCP relates to the celebrated RSA problem.
ThePolynomialCompositionProblemin(Z=nZ)[X]doesnotimplytheRSA
Problem, that is, the computation of roots in Z=nZ. Nevertheless, we exhibit
a related problem that we call Reducible Polynomial Composition Problem (RPCP)
and prove that RPCP , RSA. In particular, we prove that when Q(X) = Xq then
the Polynomial Composition Problem is equivalent to the problem of extracting
qth roots in Z=nZ.
These new problems allow us to broaden the view of existing cryptographic
constructions. Namely, we describe a general PCP-based zero-knowledge pro-
tocol of which the Fiat-Shamir and the Guillou-Quisquater protocols are par-
ticular instances. As will be seen later, if s denotes the secret, they respectively
correspond to the cases Q(X) = vX2 and Q(X) = vX (  3), with Q(s) = 1.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally
deﬁne the Polynomial Composition Problem and introduce the notations used
throughout this paper. The hardness of the problem and its comparison with
RSAareanalyzedinSection3.Finally,inSection4,weshowthatthePCPallows
one to generalize several zero-knowledge protocols.
2 The Polynomial Composition Problem
We suggest the following problem as a basis for building cryptographic proto-
cols.
Problem 1 (Polynomial Composition Problem (PCP)). Let P and Q be two
polynomials in (Z=nZ)[X] where n is an RSA modulus. Given polynomials Q
and S := Q(P), ﬁnd P.
Throughout this paper p and q denote the degrees of P and Q, respectively.
Let
P(X) =
p X
i=0
uiXiwhere the ui’s denote the unknowns we are looking for. We assume that
Q(Y) =
q X
j=0
kjYj
is known. Hence,
S(X) =
q X
j=0
kj
 
p P
i=0
uiXi
!j
:
If,givenpolynomialsQ0(Y) := Q(Y) k0 andS 0(X) := Q0(P(X)),anattacker
can recover P then the same attacker can also recover P from fQ;Sg by ﬁrst
forming polynomials Q0(Y) = Q(Y)   k0 and S 0(X) = S(X)   k0. Therefore
the problem is reduced to that of decomposing polynomials where Q has no
constant term, i.e., Q(Y) =
Pq
j=1 kjYj. Similarly, once this has been done, the
attacker can divide Q by a proper constant and replace one of the coecients
kj by one. Consequently and without loss of generality we restrict our attention
to monic polynomials Q with no constant term, that is,
Q(Y) = Yq + kq 1Yq 1 +  + k1Y : (1)
Noting that q = 1 implies that S = Q(P) = P, we also assume that q  2.
3 Analyzing the Polynomial Composition Problem
As before, let P(X) =
Pp
i=0 uiXi and let Q(Y) = Yq +
Pq 1
j=1 kjYj. Generalizing
Newton’s binomial formula and letting kq := 1, we get
S(X) =
q X
j=1
kj
 
p P
i=0
uiXi
!j
=
pq X
t=0
0
B B B B @
P
1i0++ipq
i1+2i2++pip=t
ki0++ip
(i0++ip)!
i0!:::ip! u0
i0 up
ip
1
C C C C A
|                                                {z                                                }
:=ct
Xt ; (2)
where the second sum is extended over all nonnegative integers ij satisfying
1 
Pp
j=0 ij  q and
Pp
j=0 jij = t.
3.1 RSA Problem ) Polynomial Composition Problem
We deﬁne polynomials P0;:::;Ppq 2 (Z=nZ)[U0;:::;Up] as
Pt(U0;:::;Up) :=
X
1i0++ipq
i1+2i2++pip=t
ki0++ip
(i0 +  + ip)!
i0!:::ip!
U0
i0 Up
ip   ct : (3)
Note that Pt(u0;:::;up) = 0 for all 0  t  pq.Proposition 1. For all 0  r  p, Ppq r 2 (Z=nZ)[Up r;:::;Up]. Furthermore, for
all 1  r  p, Ppq r is of degree exactly one in variable Up r.
Proof. For r = 0, we have Ppq(U0;:::;Up) = Up
q   cpq. For r = p, the condition
Ppq r 2 (Z=nZ)[Up r;:::;Up] is trivially satisﬁed.
Fixrin[1;p).Bycontradiction,supposethatPpq r < (Z=nZ)[Up r;:::;Up].So
fromEq.(3),thereexistssomeij , 0with0  j  p r 1.Since1  i0++ip  q,
it follows that i1+2i2++pip  j1+p(q 1) < pq r; a contradiction because
i1 + 2i2 +  + pip = pq   r for polynomial Ppq r.
Moreover, for all 1  r  p, Ppq r is of degree one in variable Up r since
we cannot simultaneously have 1 
Pp
j=0 ij  q,
Pp
j=0 jij = pq   r, and ip r  2.
Indeed, ip r  2 implies i1 + 2i2 +  + pip  (p   r)  2 + p  (q   2) < pq   r, a
contradiction. When ip r = 1, i1 +2i2 ++pip = pq r if ip = q 1 and ij = 0 for
all 0  (j , p   r)  p   1. This implies that the only term in Up r appearing in
polynomial Ppq r is qUp r Up
q 1, whatever the values of variables ki’s are. u t
Corollary 1. If the value of up is known then the Polynomial Composition Problem
can be solved in time O(p).
Proof. Solving for Up 1 the relation Ppq 1(Up 1;up) = 0 (which is a univariate
polynomial of degree exactly one in Up 1 by virtue of the previous proposition),
the value of up 1 is recovered. Next, the root of Ppq 2(Up 2;up 1;up) gives the
value of up 2 and so on until the value of u0 is found.
Note that the running time of the resolution process is O(p) and is thus
exponential in the bit-length of p. u t
This means that for low degree polynomials, the Polynomial Composition
Problem in Z=nZ is easier than the problem of computing qth roots in Z=nZ
because if an attacker is able to compute a qth modular root (i.e., to solve the
RSA Problem) then she can ﬁnd up from Ppq(up) = up
q   cpq = 0 and then apply
the technique explained in the proof of Corollary 1 to recover up 1;:::;u0. In
other words,
Corollary 2. RSA Problem ) Polynomial Composition Problem. u t
There is a proposition similar to Proposition 1. It says that once u0 is known,
u1;:::;up can be found successively thanks to polynomials P1;:::;Pp, respec-
tively.
Proposition 2. For all 0  r  p, Pr 2 (Z=nZ)[U0;:::;Ur]. Furthermore, for all
1  r  p, Pr is of degree exactly one in variable Ur.
Proof. We have P0(U0) =
Pq
j=1 kjU0
j   c0.
For r 2 [1;p], suppose that Pr < (Z=nZ)[U0;:::;Ur]. Therefore, i1+2i2++
pip  (r+1)1 > r; a contradiction since i1 +2i2 ++pip = r. Moreover, we can
easily see that Pr(U0;:::;Ur) = qU
q 1
0 Ur +
Pq 1
j=1 kj jU0
j 1Ur + Qr(U0;:::;Ur 1)
for some polynomial Qr 2 (Z=nZ)[U0;:::;Ur 1]. u t3.2 Reducible Polynomial Composition Problem ) RSA Problem
ThePolynomialCompositionProblemcannotbeequivalenttotheRSAProblem.
Consider for example the case p = 2 and q = 3: we have P(X) = u2X2 +u1X+u0
and Q(X) = X3 + k2X2 + k1X, and
S(X) = c6X6 + c5X5 + c4X4 + c3X3 + c2X2 + c1X + c0
with
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
c0 = k1u0 + k2u2
0 + u3
0 ;
c1 = k1u1 + 2k2u0u1 + 3u2
0u1 ;
c2 = k2u2
1 + 3u0u2
1 + k1u2 + 2k2u0u2 + 3u2
0u2 ;
c3 = u3
1 + 2k2u1u2 + 6u0u1u2 ;
c4 = 3u2
1u2 + k2u2
2 + 3u0u2
2 ;
c5 = 3u1u2
2 ;
c6 = u3
2 :
We deﬁne the polynomials P0(U0) := k1U0 + k2U2
0 + U3
0   c0, P1(U0;U1) :=
k1U1+2k2U0U1+3U2
0U1 c1,andP5(U1;U2) := 3U1U2
2 c5.Nowweﬁrstcompute
the resultant of P0 and P1 with respect to variable U0 and obtain a univariate
polynomial in U1, say R0 = ResU0(P0;P1). Next we compute the resultant of
R0 and P5 with respect to variable U1 and get a univariate polynomial in U2,
say R1 = ResU1(R0;P5). After computation, we get
R1(U2) = 27c3
1U6
2 + (27c2
1c5k1   9c2
1c5k2
2)U4
2
+( 4c3
5k3
1 + c3
5k2
2b2   18c0c3
5k1k2 + 4c0c3
5k3
2   27c2
0c3
5) :
Since u2 is a root of both R1(U2) and P6(U2) := U3
2  c6, u2 will be a root of their
greatest common divisor in (Z=nZ)[U2], which is given by
(27c2
1c5k1   9c2
1c5k2
2)c6U2
+ (27c3
1c2
6   4c3
5k3
1 + c3
5k2
1k2
2   18c0c3
5k1k2 + 4c0c3
5k3
2   27c2
0c3
5);
from which we derive the value of u2. Once u2 is known, the values of u1 and
u0 trivially follow by Corollary 1.
We now introduce a harder problem: the Reduced Polynomial Composition
Problem in (Z=nZ)[X].
Problem 2 (Reduced Polynomial Composition Problem (RPCP)). Let P and
Q be two polynomials in (Z=nZ)[X] where n is an RSA modulus. Given Q and
the deg(P) + 1 most signiﬁcant coecients of S := Q(P), ﬁnd P.
Deﬁnition 1. WhenthePolynomialCompositionProblemisequivalenttotheReduced
Polynomial Composition Problem, it is said to be reducible.Equivalently, the Polynomial Composition Problem is reducible when the
values of c0;:::;cp(q 1) 1 can be derived from cp(q 1);:::;cpq and k1;:::;kq 1. This
is for example the case when p = q = 2, that is, when P(X) = u2X2 + u1X + u0,
Q(X) = X2 + k1X, and
S(X) = c4X4 + c3X3 + c2X2 + c1X + c0
with
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
c0 = k1u0 + u2
0 ;
c1 = k1u1 + 2u0u1 ;
c2 = k1u2 + 2u0u2 + u2
1 ;
c3 = 2u1u2 ;
c4 = u2
2 :
An astute algebraic manipulation yields:
c1 =
4c2c3c4   c3
3
8c2
4
(mod n) and c0 =
4c2
1c4   c2
3k2
1
4c2
3
(mod n) :
If follows that we can omit the ﬁrst two relations (the information included
therein is anyway contained in the remaining three as we had just shown) and
theproblemamountstosolvingtheReducedPolynomialCompositionProblem:
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
c2 = k1u2 + 2u0u2 + u2
1 ;
c3 = 2u1u2 ;
c4 = u2
2 :
Theorem 1. Reducible Polynomial Composition Problem ) RSA Problem.
Proof. Assume that we are given an oracle OPCP(k1;:::;kq 1;c0;:::;cpq) which
on input polynomials Q(X) = Xq +
Pq 1
j=1 kjXj and S(X) =
Ppq
t=0 ctXt returns the
polynomialP(X) =
Pp
i=0 uiXi suchthatS(X) = Q(P(X)).Whenthepolynomial
compositionisreducible,oracleOPCP canbeusedtocomputeaqth rootofagiven
x 2 Z=nZ, i.e., compute a y satisfying yq  x (mod n).
1. choose p + q   1 random values k1;:::;kq 1;cp(q 1);:::;cpq 1 2 Z=nZ;
2. compute c0;:::;cp(q 1) 1;
3. run OPCP(k1;:::;kq 1;c0;:::;cpq 1;x);
4. get u0;:::;up;
5. set y := up and so yq  x (mod n).
Note that Step 2 can be executed since the composition is supposed to be re-
ducible. Furthermore, note that the values of cpq 1;:::;cp(q 1) uniquely determine
the values of up 1;:::;u0, respectively. Indeed, from Proposition 1,
Ppq r(Up r;up r+1;:::;up) 2 (Z=nZ)[Up r]
is a polynomial of degree exactly one of which up r is root, for all 1  r  p. u t3.3 A Practical Criterion
In this section, we present a simple criterion allowing to decide if a given
composition problem is reducible.
During the proof of Proposition 1, we have shown that there exists a poly-
nomial Qpq r 2 (Z=nZ)[Up r+1;:::;Up] such that
Ppq r(Up r;:::;Up) = qUp rUp
q 1 + Qpq r(Up r+1;:::;Up)
for all 1  r  p. From cpq = (up)q, we infer:
up r =
 Qpq r(up r+1;:::;up)
qcpq
up ; (1  r  p) : (4)
Using Eq.(4), for r = 1;:::;p, we now iteratively compute up 1;:::;u0 as a
polynomial function in up. We let p r denote this polynomial function, i.e.,
up r = p r(up) for all 1  r  p. We then respectively replace u0;:::;up 1 by
0(up);:::;p 1(up) in the expressions of c0;:::;cpq p 1. If, for each ci (0  i 
pq   p   1), the powers of up cancel thanks to (up)q 1 = cpq then the problem is
reducible.
We illustrate the technique with the example P(X) = u3X3 +u2X2 +u1X+u0
and Q(Y) = Y3. Then S(X) =
P9
t=0 ctXt with
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
c0 = u3
0 ;
c1 = 3u2
0u1 ;
c2 = 3u2
0u2 + 3u0u2
1 ;
c3 = 3u2
0u3 + 6u0u1u2 + u3
1 ;
c4 = 6u0u1u3 + 3u0u2
2 + 3u2
1u2 ;
c5 = 6u0u2u3 + 3u2
1u3 + 3u1u2
2 ;
c6 = 3u0u2
3 + 6u1u2u3 + u3
2 ;
c7 = 3u1u2
3 + 3u2
2u3 ;
c8 = 3u2u2
3 ;
c9 = u3
3 :
From the respective expressions of c8, c7 and c6, we successively ﬁnd
2(u3) =
c8
3c9
u3 ; 1(u3) =
3c7c9   c8
9c2
9
u3 ; and
0(u3) =
27c6c2
9   6c8(3c7c9   c2
8)   c3
8
81c3
9
u3 :
Since c0;:::;c5 are homogeneous in u0;u1;u2;u3 and of degree three, they can be
evaluated by replacing u0;u1;u2 by 0(u3);1(u3);2(u3), respectively, and then
replacing (u3)3 by c9. Consequently, the composition is reducible: the values ofc0;:::;c5 can be inferred from c6;:::;c9 and the problem amounts to computing
cubic roots in Z=nZ.
This is not fortuitous and can easily be generalized as follows.
Corollary 3. ForQ(Y) = Yq,thePolynomialCompositionProbleminZ=nZisequiv-
alent to the RSA Problem, i.e. to the problem of extracting qth roots in Z=nZ.
Proof. From Eq.(2), it follows that S(X) =
Ppq
t=0 ctXt with
ct =
X
i0++ip=q
i1+2i2++pip=t
q!
i0!ip!
u0
i0 up
ip ;
which is homogeneous in u0;:::;up and of degree i0 +  + ip = q. Moreover
since by induction, for 1  r  p, p r(up) = Kp r  up for some constant Kp r, the
corollary follows. u t
4 Cryptographic Applications
Loosely speaking, a zero-knowledge protocol allows a prover to demonstrate
the knowledge of a secret without revealing any useful information about the
secret. We show how to construct such a protocol thanks to composition of
polynomials.
4.1 A PCP-Based Zero-Knowledge Protocol
A trusted third party selects and publishes an RSA modulus n. Each prover P
choosestwopolynomialsP;Q in(Z=nZ)[X]andcomputesS = Q(P).fQ;Sg
is P’s public key given to the veriﬁer V so as to ascertain P’s knowledge of the
secret key P.
Execute ` times the following protocol:
 P selects a random r 2 Z=nZ.
 P evaluates c = S(r) and sends c to V.
 V sends to P a random bit b.
 If b = 0, P reveals t = r and V checks that S(t) = c.
 If b = 1, P reveals t = P(r) and V checks that Q(t) = c.
PCP-Based Protocol.
4.2 Improvements
Eciency can be increased by using the following trick:
P chooses  polynomials P1;:::;P 1;Q in (Z=nZ)[X], with   3. Her
secret key is the set fP1;:::;P 1g while her public key consists of the set fS0 =Q;S1 = Q(P 1);S2 = Q(P 1(P 2));:::;Sj = Q(P 1(:::(P j)));:::;S 1 =
Q(P 1(:::(P1)))g.
The protocol is shown below:
 P selects a random r 2 Z=nZ
 P evaluates c = S 1(r) and sends c to V.
 V sends to P a random integer 0  b     1.
 If b = 0, P reveals t = r and V checks that S 1(t) = c.
 If b , 0, P reveals t = Pb(:::(P1(r))) and V checks that S b 1(t) = c.
Nested PCP Protocol.
4.3 Relations with Other Zero-Knowledge Protocols
It is interesting to note that our ﬁrst protocol coincides with the (simpliﬁed)
Fiat-Shamir protocol [3] (see also [5, Protocol 10.24]) when P(X) = sX and
Q(X) = vX2 where vs2  1 (mod n).
ThenestedvariantmaybeseenasageneralizationoftheGuillou-Quisquater
protocol [4] by taking P1(X) = P2(X) =  = P 1(X) = sX where s is a secret
value and Q(X) = vX so that vs  1 (mod n). Indeed, in this case we have
P 1(:::(P j(X))) = sjX and hence Sj(X) = v1 jX.
An interesting research direction would be to extend the above protocols to
Dickson polynomials.
5 Conclusion
This paper introduced the Polynomial Composition Problem (PCP) and the re-
lated Reducible Polynomial Composition Problem (RPCP). Relations between
these two problems and the RSA Problem were explored. Further, two con-
crete zero-knowledge protocols suited to smart-card applications were given as
particular instances of PCP-based constructs.
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A Mathematical Background
Let R be an integral domain with quotient ﬁeld K.
Deﬁnition 2. Given two polynomials A ;B 2 R[X], the resultant of A and B,
denoted by Res(A ;B), is deﬁned as
Res(A ;B) = (am)n (bn)m
Y
1im;1jn
(i   j) (5)
if A (X) = am
Q
1im(X   i) and B(X) = bn
Q
1jn(X   j) are the decompositions
of A and B in the algebraic closure of K.
From this deﬁnition, we see that Res(A ;B) = 0 if and only if polynomials
A and B have a common root (in K); hence if and only if A and B have a
(non-trivial) common factor. Equivalently, we have
Res(A ;B) = (am)n
Y
1im
B(i) = (bn)m
Y
1jn
A (j) :
The resultant Res(A ;B) can be evaluated without knowing the decompo-
sition of A and B. Letting A (X) =
P
1im aiXi and B(X) =
P
1jn bjXj, we
have
Res(A ;B) = det
0
B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B @
am am 1 ::: a0 0 ::: 0
0 am am 1 ::: a0 ::: 0
: : :
: : :
:::
::: 
:::
: : :
0 0 0 am am 1 ::: a0
bn bn 1 ::: b0 0 ::: 0
0 bn bn 1 ::: b0 ::: 0
: : :
: : :
:::
::: 
:::
: : :
0 0 0 bn bn 1 ::: b0
1
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C A
9
> > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > ;
n rows
9
> > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > ;
m rows
:
This clearly shows that Res(A ;B) 2 R.
A multivariate polynomial A 2 R[X1;:::;Xk] (with k  2) may be viewed as
a univariate polynomial in R[X1;:::;Xk 1][Xk]. Consequently, it makes senseto compute the resultant of two multivariate polynomials with respect to one
variable,sayXk.IfA ;B 2 R[X1;:::;Xk],weletResXk(A ;B)denotetheresultant
of A and B with respect to Xk.
Lemma 1. Let A ;B 2 R[X1;:::;Xk] (with k  2). Then (1;:::;k) is a common
root (in K) of A and B if and only if (1;:::;k 1) is a root of ResXk(A ;B).
B Additional Examples
B.1 The case p = 3 and q = 2
Using the previous notations and simpliﬁcations, we write P(X) = u3X3 +
u2X2 + u1X + u0 and Q(Y) = Y2 + k1Y. Expressing the ci’s we get:
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
c0 = k1u0 + u2
0 ;
c1 = k1u1 + 2u0u1 ;
c2 = u2
1 + k1u2 + 2u0u2 ;
c3 = 2u1u2 + k1u3 + 2u0u3 ;
c4 = u2
2 + 2u1u3 ;
c5 = 2u2u3 ;
c6 = u2
3 :
Now using the criterion of x3.3, we ﬁnd u2 =
c5
2c6 u3, u1 = Vu3, and u0 =
 
k2
1
4 + Lu3 with V :=
4c4c6 c2
5
8c2
6
and L :=
8c3c2
6 c5(4c4c6 c2
5)
16c3
6
. Hence, we derive:
c2 = c6V2 + c5L; c1 = 2c6LV; and c0 =  
k2
1
4
+ L2c6 :
Being reducible, this proves that solving the PCP for p = 3 and q = 2 amounts
to computing square roots in Z=nZ.
B.2 The case p = 3 and q = 3
We have P(X) = u3X3 + u2X2 + u1X + u0 and Q(X) = X3 + k2X2 + k1X. Deﬁning
polynomials Pi as in Eq.(3), we successively compute R0 := ResU0(P0;P1),
R1 := ResU1(R0;P7), and R2 = ResU2(R1;P8) wherefrom
R2(u3) = 19683c3
1u18
3 + ( 6561c2
1c7k2
2 + 19683c2
1c7k1)u16
3
+ (2187c2
1c2
8k2
2   6561c2
1c2
8k1)u13
3
+ (2916c0c3
7k3
2 + 729c3
7k2
1k2
2   13122c0c3
7k2k1   2916c3
7k3
1
  19683c3
7c2
0)u12
3
+ ( 2916c0c2
7c2
8k3
2   729c2
8c2
7k2
2k2
1 + 13122c2
8c2
7c0k2k1 + 2916c2
8c2
7k3
1
+ 19683c2
8c2
7c2
0)u9
3
+ (972c4
8c7c0k3
2 + 243c4
8c7k2
1k2
2   4374c4
8c7c0k1k2   972c4
8c7k3
1
  6561c4
8c7c2
0)u6
3
+ ( 108c6
8c0k3
2   27c6
8k2
1k2
2 + 486c6
8c0k1k2 + 108c6
8k3
1 + 729c6
8c2
0)u3
3
= 0 :So, we obtain the value of u3 by exploiting the additional relation c9 = u3
3 and
hence the values of u2, u1, and u0.
Note that if we choose k1 = k2
2=3 then the terms in u16
3 (= c5
9 u3) and in u13
3
(= c4
9 u3) disappear and consequently the value of u3 cannot be recovered. In
this case, the criterion shows again that the problem is equivalent to that of
computing cubic roots in Z=nZ.